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Abstract: The prevalence of antimicrobial resistance (AR) limits the therapeutic options 
for treatment of infections, and increases the social benefit from disease prevention. Like 
an  environmental  resource,  antimicrobials  require  stewardship.  The  effectiveness  of  an 
antimicrobial agent is a global public good. We argue for greater use of economic analysis 
as  an  input  to  policy  discussion  about  AR,  including  for  understanding  the  incentives 
underlying health behaviors that spawn AR, and to supplement other methods of tracing 
the evolution of AR internationally. We also discuss integrating antimicrobial stewardship 
into global health governance. 
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1. Introduction 
The prevalence of drug resistance limits the therapeutic options for treatment of infections, and 
contributes to the global specter of a ―post-antimicrobial era‖ in which some of the most effective tools 
in  the  physician‘s  armamentarium—including  antibiotics,  anti-tuberculosis  and  anti-malarial  
drugs—lose their effectiveness [1-8].  
The objective of this paper is to illustrate how economic analysis can be a useful input to policy 
discussion about AR in at least three areas: understanding the incentives for health behaviors that 
contribute to resistance; analyzing the evolution of international resistance patterns; and contributing 
toward effective international governance of AR. We first discuss economic incentives surrounding 
health  behaviors  that  lead  to  development  of  drug  resistance.  Next,  to  illustrate  the  potential  for 
economic  analysis  to  contribute  to  understanding  the  global  evolution  of  resistance,  we  report  a 
preliminary study of the correlation between resistance patterns across three selected countries. We 
conclude with a short discussion of proposals for confronting the antimicrobial resistance challenge 
and a summary of our arguments. 
2. Behavior and the Economics of Antimicrobial Resistance 
Antimicrobial agents are drugs that suppress the growth and replication of microorganisms such as 
bacteria, fungi and viruses. Medical treatment with antimicrobials imposes a selection pressure on 
microbes. For example, antibiotics kill weaker bacteria and select the stronger bacteria as survivors. 
Microorganisms resistant to one particular antimicrobial can develop resistance against others with 
similar  pharmacological  methods,  giving  rise  to  multi-drug  resistance  [9-10].  Because  resistance 
confers an advantage in a world of widespread antimicrobial use, surviving pathogens pass on the 
genetic codes for resistance to their posterity. 
The applicability of economics to the problem of antimicrobial resistance extends far beyond the 
obvious and important point that treatment costs are far higher for infections caused by antimicrobial-
resistant organisms than for infections due to antimicrobial-susceptible organisms [11]. The behavior 
of numerous diverse individual consumers, patients, health care providers, and distributors contribute 
to antimicrobial resistance, involving many issues long considered central to economic analysis. 
Antimicrobial use often benefits people other than the patient—creates a positive externality—by 
helping to control the spread of infection. However, antibiotic use also selects for resistant strains, 
contributing to the problem of antimicrobial resistance. This latter negative externality arises in part 
because each user does not bear the negative repercussions of future resistance when deciding how 
much of a drug to use, thus tending to use more of the drug than would be socially desirable. One 
example  of  such  ―over-use‖  or  ―misuse‖  would  be  taking  an  antibiotic  to  treat  a  viral  infection. 
Widespread  use  of  antibiotics  to  promote  livestock  growth  also  contributes  to  selective  pressure  
on microbes [12].  
Under-use also promulgates resistance. Poor patient adherence to antimicrobial regimens increases 
selective pressure. Lack of ability to pay and shortages of antimicrobials ―promote underdosing, the 
substitution  of  available  but  unsuitable  drugs,  procurement  from  inappropriate  sources,  and  drug 
counterfeiting. Therefore, to avoid compromising therapy and promoting resistance, antimicrobials 
may need to be made more (rather than less) available in certain instances, provided their availability Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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is  intelligently  controlled  and  effective  therapeutic  doses  are  adhered  to‖  [13,  p.  572].  Patients 
contribute  to  their  own  and  their  children‘s  vulnerability  to  expensive-to-treat  or  even  incurable 
infectious disease by taking drugs in too small a dosage or for too short a time period to be effective—
except in contributing to resistance.  
Under-use  often  co-exists  with  overuse  of  low-price,  first-line  drugs.  Both  breed  resistance. 
Analyzing the underlying incentives driving under- and over-use can be important for understanding 
how policies will impact AR. Consider, for example, the likely effects of recent insurance expansions 
towards universal coverage in the U.S. and China. Increased access to care, including medications, can 
exacerbate AR when overuse is already a problem because of high levels of use (in the U.S.) or strong 
incentives for over-prescribing (in China). By contrast, among the poorest in China and in low-income 
countries, expanded access to care could potentially slow the pace of AR by enabling patients to access 
a full course of treatment or use a most costly but more effective and less resistance-prone medication. 
For example, poor malaria patients may choose an inexpensive single drug over a more expensive 
combination therapy, even though the latter is both more likely to cure them as well as to preserve 
treatment  effectiveness  for  others.  To  confront  this  dilemma,  a  report  from  the  U.S.  Institute  of 
Medicine recommends large global subsidies for antimalarial drugs known as artimisinin combination 
therapies  [14].  Laxminarayan  et al. [15, p. 325] find that ―even a partial
 subsidy could delay the 
emergence of resistance and that a delay
 in implementing a subsidy for artemisinin-based combination 
treatments could facilitate the emergence
 of resistance and lower the economic value of combination 
treatments.‖  In  this  way, economic incentives  can  be  harnessed  to encourage appropriate use and 
reduce AR.  
Economic evaluations of global health initiatives should also take account of AR. Development of 
resistance, an unavoidable side effect of even prudent antibiotic use, accelerates when antimicrobials 
are used inappropriately. Because of this negative externality from antimicrobial treatment, the social 
benefit from disease prevention is higher than it otherwise would be. Unfortunately this extra benefit 
from prevention is not routinely incorporated into the evidence base used to inform global population 
health policies. 
Another  potentially  important  contributor  to  the  resistance  problem  that  we  have  not  seen 
highlighted elsewhere is the well-documented human desire for instant gratification [16-17]. Patients 
and their loved ones want immediate cure, even if in the long run they would prefer everyone used 
drugs prudently. Overuse of antibiotics in high-income countries probably illustrates this best: parents 
may desire ―instant gratification‖ to relieve a child‘s ear infection, so the child can return to school and 
the parent to work or other pressing activities. (Ironically, most parents also want to teach children to 
think longer-term by, for example, investing in education and eschewing instant gratification from 
over-eating or substance abuse.) 
Moreover,  widespread  use  of  antibiotics  in  agriculture,  food  animals,  and  aquaculture  also 
contributes to AR, with negative consequences for preserving antimicrobial effectiveness in human 
medicine [18-20]. The importance of antimicrobial effectiveness suggests that further research into the 
behaviors undermining it merits priority. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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3. The Global Evolution of Antimicrobial Resistance 
Numerous scholars have chronicled the seemingly inexorable increase in antimicrobial resistance 
and its costs, including increased treatment spending, greater morbidity, and higher mortality. In a 
recent review of antimicrobial resistance in developing countries, Okeke et al. [12, p.481] find that 
―the general picture is one of accelerating rates of resistance spurred by antimicrobial misuse and 
shortfalls in infection control and public health. Reservoirs for resistance may be present in healthy 
human  and  animal  populations.‖  In  particular,  the  accumulating  evidence  base  suggests  that  ―the 
prevalence of resistance in seminal developing country pathogens is high and rising‖ [13, p.568]. For 
example, Figure 1 illustrates the high resistance rates to anti-Tuberculosis drugs in areas with low per 
capita resources. (By contrast, high-income countries like the US have among the world‘s highest rates 
of resistance to second- and third-line drugs, such as vancomycin among antibiotics [21].) 
Of course, the problem of AR is exceedingly complex; we are not suggesting that merely examining 
correlations  between GDP and resistance will by itself contribute to  an effective policy response. 
Many environmental, behavioral, financial and institutional factors shape the problem. Our point is 
simply that further research should seek to uncover how economic analysis can complement other 
disciplines in contributing to a better understanding of the complicated forces driving AR. 
Figure 1. The relationship between GDP per capita and resistance to any anti-Tuberculosis drug. 
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Source: Authors‘ calculations based on resistance data from [22]. The resistance data is for 1999 or latest 
available year at the time of that publication. The curve in blue results from weighting each country‘s TB 
resistance  rate  by  that  country‘s  TB  population.  The  TB  population  in  each  country  is  calculated  by 
multiplying its TB prevalence rate by its total population. For two large countries with different reported 
resistance rates across provinces, China and Russia, the national resistance rates are calculated as a weighted 
average of the reported provincial resistance rates,  where the weights represent the TB population of the 
relevant province(s). Data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for 1999 comes from the World Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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Bank‘s World Development Indicators database, available through http://www.worldbank.org/data/. GDP per 
capita is expressed in internationally comparable dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP). 
For example, the literature to date provides little evidence on whether the pace of integration of 
global commodity markets and flows of people affect countries‘ patterns of antimicrobial resistance. 
Yet with globalization trends accelerating, economic analysis of international resistance patterns could 
be a useful input to policy discussion.  
Clearly  countries‘  burdens  of  disease  and  healthcare  practices  shape  the  constellation  of 
antimicrobial use and selection pressure. Correlation of resistance patterns across countries could arise 
for a number of reasons. Ease of international travel might lead to convergence of resistance patterns 
among countries that deal more with each other. However, some drugs—such as first-generation and 
cheaper antimicrobials—are more likely to see widespread use across countries of widely varying 
resources  regardless  of  global  openness,  and  some  ―bug-drug‖  pairs  are  simply  more  prone  to  
develop resistance.  
To begin to examine these issues, we constructed coefficients of resistance correlation among three 
countries for which we had some comparable data: China, the U.S. and Kuwait. China and the U.S. are 
both large, diverse countries that are major consumers of antibiotics. Kuwait is included to examine 
patterns for a far smaller economy that is geographically distant from the U.S. and China [21]. We 
ranked resistance rates for 24 ―bug-drug‖ pairs and defined perfect correlation as each bug-drug pair 
displaying  the  same  resistance  rank.  Perfect  negative  correlation  would  exist  if  the  ranks  in  two 
countries go in precisely the opposite order.  
More specifically, we compute a Spearman‘s correlation coefficient statistic as follows: 
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where i = pair i of the 24 pairs and  a rk and  b rk  represent ranks of bug-drug pair i in countries a and b, 
respectively.  The  statistic  by  definition  is  bounded  between  −1  and  1,  where  −1  means  perfect 
disagreement while 1 means perfect agreement. Thus the bigger the statistic, the more correlated the 
two countries‘ resistance patterns are. 
We find that resistance rates in China are much more strongly correlated with those in Kuwait than 
those in the U.S. Specifically, the Spearman‘s correlation coefficient as defined above is low (0.18) 
and  not  statistically  significant  (t  =  0.85)  for  the  U.S.  and  China;  of  moderate  magnitude  and 
significance (0.46, t = 2.43) for the U.S. and Kuwait; and strong and highly significant (0.60, t = 3.52) 
for China and Kuwait [21]. These findings appear to indicate that resistance in a country is determined 
primarily  by  country-specific  factors  associated  with  economic development, such  as  strictness  of 
practices for prescribing drugs. It would be interesting to study such patterns of correlation across a 
broader set of countries, as well as how the patterns evolve over time. 
Numerous  scientific  techniques  make  tracing  patterns  of  antimicrobial  resistance  increasingly 
possible and less costly. Drug susceptibility testing is critical for appropriate clinical treatment, and 
that data can feed into surveillance efforts. Identification of specific antibiotic resistance genes is 
becoming increasingly feasible in some settings as well [23]. To these methods we suggest adding 
social science research to examine the correlations between patterns of antimicrobial resistance and Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
 
 
3146 
socioeconomic  factors  such  as  social determinants  of health-seeking  behavior,  healthcare  provider 
incentives, and measures of economic integration across regions. Metrics of drug resistance correlation 
await further refinement. We hope that others will build upon these methods for examining the global 
evolution of antimicrobial resistance. 
4. Integrating Antimicrobial Stewardship into Global Health Governance 
Like  an  environmental  resource,  antimicrobials  require  stewardship.  The  effectiveness  of  an 
antimicrobial agent is a global public good. (Rudholm [24] provides a theoretical analysis of this 
issue). No patent protects a drug from overuse or inappropriate use that leads to resistance. Because 
antimicrobial effectiveness is a global public good, international cooperation to curb antimicrobial 
resistance has elements of a classic ―prisoners‘ dilemma‖: individuals and countries fail to coordinate 
on prudent use, because high temptations to deviate (or free ride on others‘ prudence) allow descent to 
the undesired (high-resistance) equilibrium.  
Robust development of new antimicrobials could postpone the return of a ‗pre-antibiotic era‘ and 
reduce  the  aggregate  resistance  burden.  The  initial  development  and  use  of  new  drugs,  and  the 
associated decrease in burden from resistant diseases, is most likely in high-income countries. To what 
extent these  technological breakthroughs diffuse  internationally will determine whether they are a 
force for convergence or divergence of standards of living, in an age already characterized by extreme 
inequalities  in  life  opportunities  [25].  Unfortunately,  for  many  important  pathogens,  few  new 
antimicrobial agents have been developed recently. But increased awareness and appropriate economic 
incentives could stimulate renewed innovation both in drugs and diagnostics.  
One  cause  for  optimism  is  the  recent  emergence  of  numerous  international  organizations  and 
cooperation schemes addressing different facets of the antimicrobial resistance problem. Examples 
include the Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics, Resources for the Future, ReAct—Action on 
Antibiotic  Resistance,  the  International  Networks  for  the  Study  and  Prevention  of  Emerging 
Antimicrobial Resistance, the International Network for Rational Use of Drugs, The Antimicrobial 
Resistance Prevention Initiative, the Medicines for Malaria Venture, the Global Alliance for TB Drug 
Development, and various initiatives of the World Health Organization (such as its Global Gonococcal 
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Program, the WHO/International Union against Tuberculosis and Lung 
Disease  Global  Project,  and  WHONET  shareware  to  standardize  analysis  of  susceptibility  
testing results [13]).  
Strategies with promise for containing antimicrobial resistance include education for prescribers, 
distributors,  and  patients;  national  promulgation  of  combination  therapies  or  cycling  of  drugs; 
programs  such  as  the  Integrated  Management  of  Childhood  Illnesses  and  Directly  Observed 
Shortcourse Therapy for Tuberculosis; regulation of drug quality; and policies to address ―cultures of 
antimicrobial abuse‖ [13, p.568]. An effective and cost-effective response will also need to promote 
global  surveillance;  evaluate  market-based  incentives  such  prudent  drug  use  measures  in  provider 
―pay-for-performance‖ schemes (since provider payment methods can substantially affect prescribing 
and resistance trends, as South Korea‘s experience reveals [26]); and experiment with essential drug 
lists, prescribing guidelines, and new ways of making and marketing drugs to discourage inappropriate 
self-medication.  Useful  ideas  might  come  from  creative  yet  rigorous  economic  analysis,  such  as Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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applying behavioral economics to design interventions to promote rational drug use, or incorporating 
the  benefits  of  reduced  antimicrobial  resistance  in  all  economic  analyses  of  prevention.  A  global 
perspective will be imperative in encouraging innovation in drugs and diagnostics while balancing the 
need for increasing access and affordability (since, as noted above, under-use as well as over-use 
contributes to AR). Policymakers should consider creative solutions such as tiered pricing alongside 
other mechanisms for balancing these competing needs. Economists should also contribute to analysis 
of  trends  in  specific  countries,  and  how  health  system  reforms  do  or  do  not  contribute  to  better 
antimicrobial stewardship. For example, as pointed out by Heddini et al. [27], the rate of antibiotic 
resistance  in  China  is  alarmingly  high  and  growing  rapidly;  expansion  of  insurance  may  even 
exacerbate the problem. A glimmer of hope comes from the 2009 health reforms‘ inclusion of policies 
to support more rational drug use. 
5. Conclusions 
It was not so long ago that prominent reports on environmental challenges failed to identify global 
climate change as a key threat, yet few other issues have greater prominence on the environmental 
agenda for the twenty-first century [28,29]. Drawing a parallel to antimicrobial resistance is natural. 
The challenge of antimicrobial resistance should move to the forefront of the global public health 
agenda in the decades to come.  
We argue that in at least three important arenas, economic analysis can be a useful input for policy 
about  AR:  analyzing  and  shaping  the incentives that drive health behaviors such as over-use and  
under-use that contribute to resistance; quantifying the evolution of international resistance patterns; 
and helping to understand how public-private partnerships can contribute to effective international 
governance of antimicrobial effectiveness as a global public good.  
This  paper  has  several  limitations.  We  confine ourselves  to  a  short  discussion of some  salient 
issues; a more detailed exploration awaits further research. Our illustration of a potential method for 
tracing evolution of resistance patterns includes only three countries and a limited number of ―bug-
drug‖ pairs for each country. No claim can be made of global representativeness or generalizability. 
Moreover, some of the economic concepts we apply may be less familiar to medical or environmental 
science experts. We hope the limitations of our analysis will prompt others to pursue further research 
to  uncover  how  economic  analysis  can  complement  other  disciplines  in  contributing  to  a  better 
understanding of the complicated forces driving resistance. 
In sum, many institutional, environmental, behavioral, and financial factors shape the global AR 
problem. Health economists and other social scientists studying health policy should play an important 
role in understanding the behaviors that underlie AR and how to design incentives to coordinate a 
global response.  
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